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Introduction 
 Watergate symbolizes a major "turning point" in American history.
1
 This event 
allegedly shifted public sentiments from permitting a certain level of autonomy and 
secrecy in the executive branch to mandating that past presidents be held accountable to 
the people of the United States through public "ownership of and [timely] access to" their 
presidential records after they leave office.
2
  Some contend that these sentiments 
culminated in the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974 and the 
Presidential Records Act of 1978. The former "allowed the federal government to take 
possession of only presidential records produced by the Nixon administration... [and] 
stopped short of providing for state ownership of the items impounded."
3
 Whereas the 
latter  "provides for [public ownership of and] eventual access to presidential documents, 
but only from Reagan on."
4
 Together, they supposedly guarantee a new era of open 
government in the United States. 
 Scholars recently began reexamining this matter when President George W. Bush 
provoked public outrage with the issuance of Executive Order 13233 on November 1, 
2001. According to Bruce P. Montgomery, a professor of history at University of 
Colorado, Executive Order 13233: 
... nullif[ied] the 1978 Presidential Records Act (PRA) by allowing former 
presidents, vice presidents, and their heirs to assert independently based claims of 





                                                          
1
 Peter W. Rodino Jr. "Debate on Articles of Impeachment July 24, 1974," in Watergate: A Brief History 
with Documents, ed. Stanley I. Kutler (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 182. 
2
 Peter Sezzi, Personal vs. Private, Presidential Records in a Legislative Context: A Bibliographic 
Exploration (Oxford: Scarecrow, 2005), 5.    
3
 Sezzi, 3 
4
 Sezzi, 17. 
5
 Bruce P. Montgomery, "Nixon's Ghost Haunts the Presidential Records Act: The Reagan and George W. 
Bush Administrations," Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2002): 789. 
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In other words Montgomery, like so many other scholars, believes that the Presidential 
Records Act established a public entitlement to review presidential materials once 
presidents leave office and that subsequent executive orders do not reflect the will of the 
law-makers who created the legislation.
6
  
 However, a careful review of the events leading up to the signing of the PRA as 
well as the events following its adoption suggest otherwise. This thesis explores the 
development of ownership and public access to presidential records, from the 1970s to 
the present, in order to realign historical perceptions regarding the Presidential Records 
Act as well as realign perceptions concerning other issues such as Watergate, the 
PRMPA, the National Study Commission on Records and Documents of Federal 
Officials, and the vitality of democracy in the United States in the wake of the Watergate. 
In this thesis I argue that the public, through its fascination with the release of President 
Nixon's materials after Watergate, lost interest in the activities of the National Study 
Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials and, as a result, missed 
critical information for understanding the intent of the Presidential Records Act.   
 The reason for this stems from the fact that the Presidential Recordings and 
Materials Preservation Act of 1974, contrary to its portrayal as the genesis for an era of 
executive transparency, marked the beginning of the end for the short-lived transparency 
revolution prompted by Watergate. Granted law-makers offered President Nixon's 
                                                          
6
 For similar contemporary interpretations of the Presidential Records Act of 1978 see: Martha J. Kumar, 
"Executive Order 13233 Further Implementation of the Presidential Records Act," Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2002): 196; Robert D. Putnam and Robert J. Spitzer, "American Political Science 
Association Response to Executive Order 13233," Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2002): 190; 
Megan L. Bezzo, “In the Name of National Security: Executive Order 13233, the Rise of the Imperial 
Presidency, and the Degradation of Archival Autonomy.” MA Thesis, Western Washington University, 
2009, 30-31; Brett L. Erickson, “Presidential Power and Public Records: Executive Order 13233 and the 
Presidential Records Act of 1978,” MA Thesis, University of Nebraska, 2009, 50-51; Kevin Burge, "The 
Presidential Records Act of 1978: Its Development from the Right to Know and the Public's Demand for 
Federal Records Ownership," MA Thesis, Auburn University, 2008, 75-77. 
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Watergate materials to the public by way of the PRMPA.
7
 This act of good faith by the 
government reestablished public trust in Washington DC for holding Nixon accountable 
for his deeds. Though, the release of these materials took precedence over the National 
Study Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials.
8
 This was odd 
considering the PRMPA charged the commission with the significant responsibility of 
generating a report to make recommendations on how to reform the processes that 
allowed Watergate to happen.
9
 Indeed, the treasure trove of Watergate materials 
overshadowed all other discourse in the nation and these circumstances allowed law-
makers, who were eager to restore legitimacy to the executive branch, to slip a provision 
into the PRA that permits the incumbent president to unilaterally determine the extent of 
public access to the materials of former presidents by issuing executive orders.
10
 
 This overlooked bit of history went widely unnoticed until recently. Now law-
makers and scholars realize some of the deficiencies with the PRA. However, the recent 
solutions suggested by members of Congress and the scholarly community to improve the 
PRA fail to address the issue of allowing the incumbent president to have sweeping 
authority on public access to the materials of former presidents through the use of 
executive orders. What can we infer from this development? What does this situation tell 
us about transparency, accountability, and the state of democracy in the United States?  
 In order to fully appreciate the aforementioned information, this thesis provides a 
                                                          
7
 Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, U.S. Code 44 Chapter 21 (1974), § 2111, Sec. 
101 - Sec. 106. 
http://www.archives.gov/about/laws/nara.html#material 
8
 Anna Kasten Nelson, "The Public Documents Commission: Politics and Presidential Records," 
Government Publications Review vol. 9, (1982): 444-445. 
9
 Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, U.S. Code 44 Chapter 33 (1974), §3316. 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2008-title44/pdf/USCODE-2008-title44-chap33.pdf  
10
 Presidential Records, U.S. Code 44 Chapter 22 (1978), §2204, (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B). 
 http://www.archives.gov/about/laws/presidential-records.html  
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rich narrative presented in the form of a three-part odyssey in order to provide a 
panoramic view of ownership and access to presidential records from Watergate to the 
present. The first section analyzes Watergate from the break-in of the Watergate Hotel to 
the Supreme Court ruling on Nixon v. Administrator of General Services in 1977. The 
lessons learned from Watergate serve as a reference point for the subsequent chapters. 
The second section focuses on the bipartisan consensus regarding transparency in the 
executive branch. This inquiry begins with a discussion on the National Study 
Commission on the Records of Federal Officials and ends with the signing of the 
Presidential Records Act of 1978. The third section examines the events following the 
PRA with particular emphasis on its implementation and public reaction to these 
activities. It begins with a discussion on Executive Order 12667 signed by President 
Reagan in 1989 and ends with the most recent presidential records reform efforts in 2009. 
 The last part of the paper is reserved for the concluding remarks where I argue 
that the activities during Watergate, prior to the signing of the Presidential Records Act, 
and events following the signing of the PRA suggest that the PRA was not created to 
ensure transparency in government. Rather, the PRA was created to abolish the 
presidential library system and establish a centralized location for incumbent 
administrations and their staff to have ready access to the duplicate copies of federal 
records from former administrations via storage at the National Archives. If this was not 
the case, then the public would not require Freedom of Information requests to access to 
the sensitive or controversial records of former presidents; nor would the PRA provide 
the incumbent president with sweeping authority to unilaterally determine the extent of 
public access to the materials of former presidents through the usage of executive orders. 
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I. Watergate: Reigning in Nixon 
 "When the President does it, that means that it is not illegal."—Richard M. Nixon 
 television interview with David Frost, May 20, 1977  
  
 On June 17, 1972 "[f]ive men... were arrested... in what authorities described as 
an elaborate plot to bug the offices of the Democratic National Committee" at the 
Watergate Hotel in Washington DC.
11
 Two days later the press reported that one of these 
individuals, James W. McCord, worked for the GOP "to provide security services to the 
Republican National Committee."
12
 Further inquiry revealed that these individuals had 
ties to the Richard Nixon's 1972 Committee to Re-elect the President, also known by the 
acronym CREEP, and that McCord held the position of security director for the 
organization.
13
 Evidence recovered from the investigation also implicated G. Gordon 
Liddy and former CIA officer E. Howard Hunt as the masterminds behind the Watergate 
break-in. Together these men comprised a special operations unit known as the White 
House Plumbers whose operations consisted of the Watergate break-in, the harassment of 
Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg, and several other clandestine operations which 
remained unknown to the public until the Watergate Scandal.
14
 "On September 15, 1972, 
Liddy, Hunt, and the five persons arrested in the DC Watergate offices on June 17 were 
indicted for burglary, unlawful entry for the purpose of intercepting oral and wire 
communications and conspiracy, all felonies."
15
  
                                                          
11
 Alfred E. Lewis, "5 Held in Plot to Bug Democrats' Office Here," The Washington Post, June 18, 1972. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2002/05/31/AR2005111001227.html 
12
 Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, "GOP Security Aide Among 5 Arrested in Bugging Affair," The 
Washington Post, June 19, 1972. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/tours/scandal/watergat.htm  
13
 Peter W. Rodino Jr., Impeachment of Richard Nixon: The Final Report of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, House of Representatives (New York: Viking, 1975), 60-65. 
14
 For more information on the activities of the Plumbers, see: Rodino, Impeachment of Richard Nixon, 
234-241. 
15
 Rodino, Impeachment of Richard Nixon , 87. 
  
Menace to Democracy p.9 
 
 Suspicions of White House involvement in the break-in grew as The Washington 
Post reported that "[a] $25,000 cashier's check, apparently earmarked for President 
Nixon's re-election campaign, was deposited in April in a bank account of one of the five 
men arrested in the break-in at Democratic National Headquarters."
16
 Later in the year, 
The Washington Post publicized that "John N. Mitchell, while serving as U.S. Attorney 
General, personally controlled a secret Republican fund that was used to gather 
information about the Democrats."
17
 In the following month, the FBI announced that:  
 ... the Watergate bugging incident stemmed from a massive campaign of political 
 spying and sabotage conducted on behalf of President Nixon's re-election and 





Despite these shocking revelations, Nixon won reelection in a landslide victory in the 
1972 election against George McGovern. However, this chain of events piqued public 
interest and mandated further investigation, both criminal and congressional, into the 
connection between the Watergate burglars and Richard Nixon.   
 Before long more Republican officials, with closer ties to the Nixon, distanced 
themselves from the President. On April 30, 1973 "White House advisers, H.R. 
Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, along with Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst" 
resigned their posts and Nixon "fired... [White House] counsel, John W. Dean III" in the  
 
                                                          
16
 Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, "Bug Suspect Got Campaign Funds," The Washington Post, August 
1, 1972. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2002/06/03/AR2005111001229.html 
17
 Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, "Mitchell Controlled Secret GOP Fund," The Washington Post, 
September 29, 1972.  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2002/06/03/AR2005111001231.html 
18
 Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, "FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats," The Washington 
Post, October 10, 1972.   
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2002/06/03/AR2005111001232.html 
  




 These resignations, as well as the firing of Dean, raised suspicion of White 
House involvement in the Watergate break-in even further. Within two months the Senate 
started its own investigation into the matter.  
 North Carolina Senator "Sam Ervin gaveled the Senate Select Committee to order 
on May 17" in the spring of 1973.
20
 In addition to the Senate hearings, the Department of 
Justice launched its own investigation. "The President... [granted] Attorney General 
designate Elliot Richardson absolute authority to make all of the decisions bearing upon 
the prosecution of the Watergate case and related matters."
21
 Richardson appointed 
Archilbald Cox as Special Prosecutor to the case. "On May 21, 1973 Richardson 
appeared with... Cox before the Senate Judiciary Committee" to discuss the authority and 
jurisdiction of the Special Prosecutor.
22
 Richardson stated that Special Prosecutor Cox 
had jurisdiction over: 
 ... offenses arising out of the unauthorized entry into the DNC headquarters at the 
 Watergate, offenses arising out of the 1972 presidential election, allegations 
 involving the President, members of the White House staff or presidential 
 appointees and other matters which the Special Prosecutor consented to have 
 assigned by the Attorney General. The same guidelines also provided that the 
 Special Prosecutor would have full authority for determining whether to contest 
 the assertion of executive privilege of  any other testimonial privilege and that he 




The Special Prosecutor received the Senate Judiciary Committee stamp of approval. 
President Nixon expressed his support for both Richardson and Cox. Although, after the 
                                                          
19
 Laurence Stern and Haynes Johnson, "3 Top Nixon Aides, Kleindienst Out; President Accepts Full 
Responsibility; Richardson Will Conduct New Probe," The Washington Post, May 1, 1973. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2002/05/31/AR2005111001235.html 
20
 Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1990), 350. 
21
 Rodino, Impeachment of Richard Nixon , 176. 
22
 Rodino, Impeachment of Richard Nixon , 176. 
23
 Rodino, Impeachment of Richard Nixon , 176; For the full testimony of Elliot Richardson, see: United 
States Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, Ninety-Third Congress, on Special 
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hearings, Nixon reiterated "to Richardson that the waiver of executive privilege extended 
to testimony but not to documents."
24
 In other words, neither the Attorney General nor 
the Special Prosecutor had the authority to review presidential materials to discern the 
legitimacy of claims of executive privilege asserted by the President. As a result, the 
President put himself in the position to unilaterally determine the size and scope of 
executive privilege.  
 Nevertheless, the investigations continued in both the Department of Justice and 
the United States Senate. The assertion made by Nixon had little relevance until Sam 
Ervin's Senate investigation uncovered that: 
 [f]ormer presidential counsel John W. Dean III...discussed aspects of the
 Watergate cover-up with President Nixon or in Mr. Nixon's presence on at least 





The Senate Committee also revealed through the testimony of former White House aide 
Alexander Butterfield that:  
 President Nixon has been routinely taping all his conversations and meetings in 
 the Oval Office and cabinet room of the White House, in his Executive Office 




This revelation immediately prompted both Ervin and Cox to request the White House 
tapes. Nixon of course, invoking the right of executive privilege, refused to give up the 




                                                          
24
 Rodino, Impeachment of Richard Nixon , 177. 
25
 Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, "Dean Alleges Nixon Knew of Cover-up Plan," The Washington 
Post, June 3, 1973.  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2002/05/31/AR2005112200792.html 
26
 Lawrence Meyer, "President Taped Talks, Phone Calls; Lawyer Ties Ehrlichman to Payments," The 
Washington Post, July 17, 1973. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2002/06/03/AR2005112200794.html 
27
 Rodino, Impeachment of Richard Nixon, 43. 
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  After being refused by the President, Special Prosecutor Cox subpoenaed nine of 
the tapes. It took a court order and a denial in a US Court of Appeals before Nixon even 
entertained the subpoena. Nixon then started making demands regarding under what 
conditions he would release the tapes.
28
 The President demanded that in exchange for the 
subpoenaed tapes that Special Prosecutor Cox would refrain from subpoenaing any more 
executive materials. This ultimatum did not sit well with Attorney General Richardson. 
Then "[o]n the evening of October 19, 1973, the President issued a statement ordering 
Cox to agree to the proposal and desist from issuing subpoenas for tapes and 
documents."
29
 Cox refused to comply with Nixon's demands. The President then ordered 
Attorney General Richardson to fire Cox. Richardson refused to discharge Cox from his 
duties. Both he and Deputy Attorney General William D. Ruckelshaus resigned, instead 




 Critics already advocated impeachment prior to the resignations of Richardson  
and Ruckelshaus as well as the firing of Special Prosecutor Cox.
31
 Pressure towards 
impeachment mounted further with the release of White House tapes and transcripts that 
Nixon's staff altered. Some transcripts of the tapes were censored. However, the most 
outrage stemmed from a tape that contained an "18 1/4-minute gap in the recording."
32
 
White House Chief-of-Staff Alexander Haig could not thoroughly explain the gap. The 
                                                          
28
 For more information on the between Nixon, and Special Prosecutor Cox, and Attorney General 
Richardson, see: Rodino, Impeachment of Richard Nixon, 179-181. 
29
 Rodino, Impeachment of Richard Nixon, 180. 
30
 Carroll Kilpatrick, "Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit," The Washington Post, 
October 21, 1973.  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2002/06/03/AR2005112200799.html 
31
 Jules Witcover, "Pressure for Impeachment Mounting," The Washington Post, October 21, 1973.  
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2002/06/03/AR2005112200800.html 
32
 George Lardner Jr., "Haig Tells of Theories on Erasure," The Washington Post, December 7, 1973. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2002/06/03/AR2005112200802.html 
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media increased their pressure on the White House. On November 17, 1973 during a 
press conference Nixon reiterated that he no personal knowledge relevant to Watergate 
and stated that "[he was] not a crook."
33
  
 During his 1974 State of the Union, President Nixon pleaded with lawmakers and 
the public by stating "the time [had] come to bring [the] investigation and the other 
investigations ... to an end. One year of Watergate [was] enough."
34
 Needless to say, this 
did not distract nor dissuade the Special Prosecutor and Congress from their 
investigations. The Special Prosecutor indicted former Attorney General John Mitchell 
and former White House aides H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman on March 1, 1974. 
Nixon's inner circle started to collapse. In response to this Nixon attempted to undermine 
the mandate for the investigation by releasing "1,254 pages of the secretly recorded 




  This did not have the desired effect. Special Prosecutor Jaworksi continued to 
press the White House for more documents and materials. "On April, 18, 1974 Judge 
Sirica issued a trial subpoena requested by... [Jaworski] for 64 presidential 
conversations."
36
 Nixon vehemently objected to the subpoena and asserted claims of 
executive privilege over the requested materials. The ultimate showdown between the 
Special Prosecutor and the President commenced. Eventually, this issue made its way up 
to the US Supreme Court under US v. Nixon. Then on July 24, 1974 the Supreme Court 
                                                          
33
 Carroll Kilpatrick, "Nixon Tells Editors, 'I'm Not a Crook'," The Washington Post, November 18, 1973. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2002/06/03/AR2005112200801.html 
34
 President Richard Nixon, "State of the Union Address," January 30, 1974. 
http://www.infoplease.com/t/hist/state-of-the-union/187.html 
35
 Haynes Johnson, "Nixon Hands Over Transcripts," The Washington Post, May 1, 1974. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2002/05/31/AR2005112200803.html 
36
 Rodino, Impeachment of Richard Nixon, 576. 
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ruled "unanimously, and definitively, that President Nixon must turn over tape recordings 
of White House conversations needed by the Watergate special prosecutor for the trial of 
the President's highest aides."
37
 Nixon coordinated the handing over of the subpoenaed 
materials within a week.  
 Three days after the Supreme Court ruling, "[t]he House Judiciary Committee 
took the momentous step... of recommending that the president of the United States be 
impeached and removed from office."
38
 The walls started closing in on Nixon. On August 
5, 1974 the infamous "smoking gun" tape was released that directly implicated Nixon and 
his closest advisors with the obstruction of the Watergate investigation.
39
 In the 
conversation on the tape, Haldeman and Nixon hatched a plan to solicit Director of the 
CIA Richard Helms and Deputy Director of the CIA Vernon A. Walters to approach 
Director of the FBI L. Patrick Gray and request that he halt the Watergate investigation 
on grounds of national security. Nixon knew investigators would eventually review the 
contents of the tape. He also knew that Congress fully intended on going through with the 
impeachment. The President realized there was absolutely no way out. The judicial 
branch stripped him of the his last line of defense, executive privilege. 
 Nixon announced his resignation on August 8, 1974 and left the Office of the  
 
                                                          
37
 John P. MacKenzie, "Court Orders Nixon to Yield Tapes; President Promises to Comply Fully," The 
Washington Post, July 25, 1974 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2002/06/03/AR2005112200805.html 
 Supreme Court of the United States, United States v. Nixon, President of the United States, et al, 418 U.S. 
683 (1974).  
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=418&invol=683 
38
 Richard Lyons and William Chapman, "Judiciary Committee Approves Article to Impeach President 
Nixon, 27 to 11," The Washington Post, July 28, 1974. 
39
 White House, "Transcript of a Recording of a Meeting Between the President and H.R. Haldeman  in the 
Oval Office on  June 23, 1972 From 10:04 TO 11:39 AM," June 23, 1972. 
http://nixon.archives.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/watergate/trial/exhibit_01.pdf 
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President the following day.
40
 President Ford issued a full pardon for Nixon a month 
later.
41
 In his pardon, Ford offered a rationalization behind not holding Nixon 
accountable for his crimes: 
 It is believed that a trial of Richard Nixon, if it became necessary, could not fairly 
 begin until a year or more has elapsed. In the meantime, the tranquility to which  
 this nation has been restored by the events of recent weeks could be irreparably 
 lost by the prospects of bringing to trial a former President of the United States. 
 The prospects of such trial will cause prolonged and divisive debate over the 
 propriety of exposing to further punishment and degradation a man who has 
 already paid the unprecedented penalty of relinquishing the highest elective office 




In other words, Ford issued a pardon in order to rescue both Nixon and the legitimacy of 
the Office of the President from public scrutiny. Nixon, in his response to the pardon, 
offered critical insight into the mentality of the executive branch concerning matters of 
criminality: 
 My perspective on Watergate is quite different than it was while I was embattled 
 in the midst of the controversy, and while I was still subject to the unrelenting 
 daily demands of the presidency itself. Looking back on what is still in my mind a 
 complex and confusing maze of events, decisions, pressures and personalities, one 
 thing I can see clearly now is that I was wrong in not acting more decisively and 
 more forthrightly in dealing with Watergate, particularly when it reached the stage 




In this statement Nixon suggested that, while president, he viewed Watergate as a 
distraction from his daily activities as President of the United State and that actions of 
grave criminality equate to nothing more than trivial political scandals. 
                                                          
40
 Carroll Kilpatrick, "Nixon Resigns," The Washington Post, August 9, 1972.  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2002/06/03/AR2005033108821.html 
41
 President Carter later commuted the sentence of Watergate participant and Nixon staffer, G. Gordon 
Liddy as well. This further demonstrated that the executive branch did not hold itself accountable; 
President Jimmy Carter, "Commutation of G. Gordon Liddy's Prison Sentence Announcement of the 
Commutation, With the Text of the Order, With the Text of the Order," April 12, 1977. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7345  
42
 President Gerald R. Ford, "Proclamation 4311, Granting a Pardon to Richard Nixon," September 8, 1974. 
http://watergate.info/ford/pardon-proclamation.shtml  
43
 Richard M. Nixon, "Response to Proclamation 4311,"  
http://watergate.info/ford/pardon.shtml 
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 Despite Nixon's presidential pardon from Ford, there still remained the issue of 
the documents and materials related to Watergate which the Supreme Court did not order 
Nixon to turn over to the Special Prosecutor. Law-makers and scholars feared that Nixon 
would destroy all other Watergate related materials in his possession since, up to this 
point, presidential documents and materials were considered personal property of the 
former president. They had cause to be concerned for the reason that,  prior to leaving 
office on September 8, Nixon cut a deal with the head of the General Services 
Administration Arthur F. Sampson two days before whereby the former president 
retained personal control of the White House tapes. As a result, Congress hastily passed 
the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974 that mandated the 
Archivist to seize control of Nixon's presidential materials, identify the materials relevant 
to Watergate, and immediately begin processing them for public acquisition.
44
 
 Nixon challenged the constitutionality of this act in Nixon v. Administrator of 
General Services on five significant grounds. He claimed that the act violated the 
separation of powers clause; that it violated a president's privilege of confidentiality; that 
the act invaded his personal privacy; that it interfered with his First Amendment rights; 
and that the act violated the bill of attainder clause.
45
 The Supreme Court disagreed on all 
five challenges and, subsequently, upheld the Presidential Recordings and Materials 
Preservation Act. Thus, the PRMPA became the first law in US history to declare 
government control of presidential property.  
 Looking back, the Watergate scandal offered critical insight into a number of 
                                                          
44
 Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, U.S. Code 44 Chapter 21 (1974).    
http://www.archives.gov/about/laws/nara.html#2111-note 
45
 United States Supreme Court, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=433&invol=425 
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issues relevant to democracy and an open society. First, it suggests that presidents have 
the means and motive to conduct questionable operations to get the upper-hand on their 
political adversaries. Second this development provides that the executive branch will 
censor material with embarrassing, unethical, or illegal information when releasing these 
materials to the public by asserting claims of executive privilege. Third, this narrative 
holds that a special prosecutor, without the support of the judicial branch, stands no 
chance at policing the executive for the reason that they still work for the executive and  
must comply with the orders of the president. Fourth,  the unfolding of Watergate posits 
that it takes the efforts of all three branches of government to reign in a rogue president 
as well as to ensure accountability and transparency in the executive branch. Lastly, the 
aftermath of Watergate reveals that presidents consider scandals, even from former 
presidents, to be a distraction toward their daily duties and that acts of presidential 
criminality equate to nothing more than trivial political scandals. Moreover, the 
pardoning of Nixon illustrates that presidents are held to a different, more lenient, 
standard than the rest of us and that incumbent presidents will place the preservation of 
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II. Presidential Records Act: New Era of Open Government? 
 
 "Watergate may be over, but public records are still in jeopardy."—Anna Kasten 
 Nelson, "The Public Documents Commission Politics and Presidential Records," 
 Government Publications Review, vol. 9, (1982): 450. 
  
 The Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974 contained a 
provision that mandated the creation of the National Study Commission on Records and 
Documents of Federal Officials.
46
 This provision stated that:  
[i]t shall be the duty of the Commission to study problems and questions with 
respect to the control, disposition, and preservation of records and documents 
produced by or on behalf of Federal officials, with a view toward the development 
of appropriate legislative recommendations and other recommendations regarding 





In other words, the legislation charged the Commission with the responsibility of 
determining the extent of personal ownership of federal officials' materials as well as the 
degree to which the public should have access to those records. The findings of the 
Commission would presumably serve as the template for federal legislation to ensure a 
new era of accountability and transparency in government in the wake of Watergate. 
However, the PRMPA did not require Congress to abide by the findings of the 
Commission in the drafting of legislation regarding the materials of federal officials nor 
did the PRMPA obligate Congress to take any action at all once the Commission 
submitted its report. The PRMPA granted Congress a lot of leeway in their enforcement 
of the Commission's suggestions. Although, Congress ultimately based its bills on the 
findings and suggestions of the Commission for the Presidential Records Act of 1978. 
   The Commission undoubtedly served as a critical role in framing the future 
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debate over ownership and access of federal officials' materials. The PRMPA guided the 
activities of the Commission to center around seven key concerns of lawmakers.
48
 First, 
the legislation directed the Commission to determine whether or not the traditional 
approach to dealing with presidential records was acceptable and whether or not this 
practice should also apply to the materials of federal officials in the other two branches of 
government. Second, it instructed the Commission to consider its findings in relation to 
§2107 through §2112 of U.S. Code 44 Chapter 21.
49
 Third, the PRMPA informed the 
Commission to determine whether their findings "should affect the control, disposition, 
and preservation of records and documents of agencies within the Executive Office of the 
President created for short-term purposes by the President."
50
 Fourth, the legislation 
ordered the Commission to consider "the recordkeeping procedures of the White House 
Office" in order to identify which materials the White House Office produces for the use 
of the President.
51
 Fifth, it mandated that the Commission evaluate "the nature of rules 
and procedures which should apply to the control, disposition, and preservation of 
records and documents produced by Presidential task forces, commissions, and boards."
52
 
Sixth, the provision ordered the Commission to identify "criteria which may be used 
generally in determining the scope of materials which should be considered to be the 
records and documents of Members of the Congress."
53
 Lastly, the PRMPA required the  
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Commission to evaluate "the privacy interests of individuals whose communications with 
Federal officials, and with task forces, commissions, and boards, are a part of the records 
and documents produced by such officials. task forces, commissions, and boards."
54
 In 
addition to these measures, the PRMPA granted the Commission the authority to 
investigate any other issues that they deemed necessary. 
 Such was the magnanimous task of the National Study Commission on Records 
and Documents of Federal Officials. Although, the main provisions in the PRMPA also 
unintentionally worked to undermine the activities of the Commission by charging the 
Ford administration with the momentous obligation of preparing the Nixon presidential 
recordings and materials for distribution to the Archivist of the United States for 
processing. President Ford was faced with a choice: either comply with the main 
provisions of the PRMPA that called for the processing and distribution of Nixon's 
presidential records for public use or fulfill his obligation under the PRMPA to appoint 
three delegates to the Commission and their chairman from among the three in order to 
facilitate their inquiry. Saddled with this choice, Ford ultimately decided on "emptying 
files [rather] than appointing a commission."
55
 This decision ensured a significant delay 
in the assembly of the Commission and the fervor over the release of Nixon's presidential 




 Nevertheless, the first meeting did not convene until a full year from the signing 
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 After appointing Herbert Brownell as Chairman of the Commission, 
President Ford pursued a hands-off approach to its activities. "No attempt was made to 
influence the course of the Commission's work and no agreements were reached as to the 
procedure."
58
 The agenda of the Commission was left entirely to the discretion of Herbert 
Brownell. Nevertheless, the Commission conducted multiple panel discussions and 
public hearings. In addition to this it also received several independent surveys and case 
studies relevant to presidential, congressional, and judicial records.  
 During the course of its inquiry, the Commission collected some significant 
testimonies and controversial information that would ultimately not make it into the 
recommendations of the final report. The panel discussion that took place on January 14, 
1977 cut to the heart to the issue of presidential records by exploring every perspective 
with respect to the ownership and access to the materials in exhaustive detail. At the 
beginning of the discussion Andrew Goodpaster, former Staff Secretary to the President 
under Dwight Eisenhower, made a bold claim that "Watergate is perhaps not the best 
basis on which to form the set of arrangements that should guide... [the] government in its 
general conduct of affairs."
59
 In other words, Goodpaster believed that Watergate was an 
isolated incident. Moreover, he argued that any evaluation of ownership and access to 
presidential records with Watergate in mind was an unwarranted overreaction.  
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 In the same discussion Bryce Harlow, former Administrative Assistant to 
President Eisenhower, stated the main problem of establishing a new process for public 
access to presidential records stems from the fact that the tendency would be to either 
establish "a process that would create no records at all that are wanted by most, or the 
continuation of very highly sensitive, very confidential records that are revealed much 
later."
60
 The former model ended up as one of the two initial proposals in Congress 
following the submission of the Commission's report and, ironically, the latter resembled 
the final product that Congress arbitrated over during the legislative process for the 
Presidential Records Act of 1978.  Thus, in a way, the points made by Harlow 
foreshadowed the future debate over the PRA.  
 Building on the points raised by Harlow, Stephen Hess discussed several issues 
including his views on presidential materials as well as the materials of presidential 
advisors. He argued that:  
[p]residential papers should belong to the United States, and that the people who 
accept political appointments can no longer be essentially private people. They 
should understand this before accepting their office, and obviously they don't 




This touched on one of the most hot-buttoned issues concerning executive transparency. 
It was the discussions with presidential advisors that implicated Nixon in obstructing the 
Watergate investigation. Yet the materials relating to presidential advisors ended up 
being the most closely guarded records during the Commission's investigation and 
subsequent legislative proposals in Congress.  
 In part, this was due to the so-called "chilling effect." This theory presumed that 
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advisors would withhold controversial advice from the officials they serve if the advice 
would eventually end up in the public domain. Hence, why some officials started 
recommending the materials of their advisors be exempt from eventual public access. 
Hess countered this assertion by stating that it is the responsibility of public servants to: 
do one's best in government, that is giving the best advice possible if one is in the 
advice-giving business to the President, understanding full well that sooner or 





According to Hess, this was for the reason that candid advice "takes [precedence] over all 
other considerations, such as right to privacy, potential embarrassment, and so forth."
63
 
Hess pressed on by claiming:  
that potential embarrassment to one's self or to others should not be the criterion 
for suppressing records, official records--of course, excluding national security 





In doing so Hess, one of the most vocal advocates for open government, assisted in the 
whitewashing of Watergate history since Nixon attempted to use national security as a 
vehicle to conceal his involvement in obstructing the Watergate investigation. Moreover, 
this statement reaffirmed the practice of protecting administration underlings and 
controversial issues under the premise of national security. Regardless, the views held by 
Hess reflect some of the Commission's recommendations and seemingly influenced both 
initial pieces of legislation after the Commission submitted its reports. These views even 
embody the consensus reached in the language of the Presidential Records Act. Although, 
this was not the only intriguing facet of this discussion. 
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 Another issue raised by the discussion panel addressed the problems of policy 
communication between outgoing and incoming administrations. William J. Hopkins, 
who served as the records keeper in the White House from 1931 to 1971, stated that 
"[e]ach administration... as it came in, questioned the system. They couldn't understand it. 
They questioned 'How can we have any continuity when we don't have the files of the 
previous administration?'"
65
 However, according to Hopkins, the outgoing 
administrations "were all in favor" of the current system of records management.
66
 This 
discussion established that, in addition to a conflict between private ownership and public 
access to presidential materials, there existed a tension between outgoing presidents, who 
took their materials with them to disjointed presidential libraries, and the incoming 




 Hopkins claimed that incoming administrations could reestablish continuity by 
tracking down the copies of the outgoing materials that presidents took with them. These 
duplicates were presumably left behind in the various government agencies and 
departments. Though this proved to be a hassle for incoming administrations and, as 
noted by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in the same panel, in some instances the duplicated 
materials did not get housed in their respective agencies or departments. Consequently, 
Schlesinger argued, "we can't always be certain that documents necessary for the  
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continuity of the public business are going to be found in other places."
68
 Thus, the 
Commission uncovered that there existed a need for a consolidation of former 
presidential materials so that incoming administrations could have ready access to the 
important materials of outgoing administrations. In other words, the housing of former 
presidential materials in presidential libraries hampered the daily operations of the 
executive branch. 
 The materials of primary concern for incoming administrations were diplomatic 
cables and intelligence reports. Walt W. Rostow, former Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs to President Johnson, also noted that these materials needed to be 
guarded from premature release to the public. Rostow argued that this was necessary in 
order to protect intelligence sources as well as prevent a "chilling effect" within the 
executive branch.
69
 Adding to this, Schlesinger claimed that "for most purposes... [a 
disclosure] interval of ten years would be about right for both domestic and foreign 
policy, leaving out certain deeply sensitive ones of national security."
70
 Although, 
Schlesinger really believed "that the personal and political papers are the real treasure for 
the historian."
71
 Moreover, Schlesinger stated that: 
 these [materials] should be treated in the same way as those papers necessary for 
 the continuity of the public business, and that this requires on the one hand a 
 certain discretion in the way they're used, requires protection for them, but on the 
 other hand, since they are being protected and held and so on for eventual use, 
 that use should be part of--is the objective, and that should be kept in mind too.
72
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In other words, Schlesinger argued that the personal and political papers of former 
presidents should be housed in the same manner as the materials of former presidents 
relating to national security. However, Schlesinger claimed that materials concerning 
national security should be kept under lock and key at the discretion of the executive 
branch. This was a notion that all of the panel agreed upon—even Stephen Hess. 
 The ideas generated during this discussion eventually found their way into the 
recommendations made by the Commission in its report as well as in the language of the 
bill the Presidential Records Act.  Though the drafting of the report did not turn out to be 
a smooth process. In January of 1977, the Commission prepared to write the report. A 
legal report was due the following February and the recommendations report was due on 
March 31.
73
 However, due to the organization of the Commission office, none of the 
Commission members knew whether Brownell's staff would write the recommendations 
report or whether the Brownell's legal staff was solely focused on writing the February 
report.  
 Despite the confusion, a subcommittee of the Commission took the initiative in 
drafting the report because most were "[r]eluctant to leave matters in the hands of the 
chairman."
74
 Tensions grew even greater between the members of the Commission and 
Chairman Brownell during the March 7 meeting whereby "the Commission learned that... 
Brownell did not intend to support the majority report. Instead, he was submitting an 
'alternate report' written by the legal staff under the direction of Dressander and 
Rankin."
75
 The reason for the alternate report was a disagreement between Brownell and 
                                                          
73
 U.S. Code 44 Chapter 33 (1974), §3322; Nelson, 446. 
74
 Nelson, "The Public Documents Commission: Politics and Presidential Records," 446. 
75
 Nelson, "The Public Documents Commission: Politics and Presidential Records," 446.  
  
Menace to Democracy p.27 
 
the Commission members on whether or not to have a universal method of dealing with 
materials generated by the three branches of government. Brownell believed the materials 
generated by all three branches should be treated in the same manner and the 
Commission members disagreed. Yet, the subcommittee desperately tried to compromise 
with Brownell in order to prevent the submission of two reports. Hence the inclusion of 
Brownell's views in the subcommittee's report.  
 In spite of the attempted compromise, the Commission submitted two separate 
reports—a minority report drafted by the legal staff and the majority report written by the 
subcommittee. The majority report made some notable recommendations. First, the report 
suggested that "documentary materials produced or received by the President, his staff, 
and units or individuals in the Executive Office of the President should be divided into 
three categories: (A) Federal records, (B) Presidential Public Papers, and (C) Personal 
papers of the President."
76
 Federal records were "documentary materials made of 
received by the units of the Executive Office of the President other than those who sole 
function is to advise and assist."
77
 The Commission defined presidential public papers as:  
 documentary materials that the President and his immediate staff made or
 received in connection with the President's constitutional or statutory duties or 
 that were made or received by units of the Executive Office of the President 




In other words, federal records included documents such as diplomatic cables and 
intelligence reports that incoming administrations expressed interest in according to the 
January 14, 1977 discussion panel and presidential public papers included documents that 
the president's office produced apart from these sensitive communications and reports 
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generated by the various government agencies and departments. The personal papers of 




 The Commission proposed that federal records and presidential public papers 
should be considered public property whereas the personal papers of the president should 
be considered the private property of the former president to manage on his own terms.
80
 
The Commission also discussed public access to federal records and presidential public 
papers. The report maintained that public access to federal records should be subject to 
Freedom of Information Act regulations.
81
 The Commission also argued that restrictions 
to public access of presidential public papers should not exceed a "fifteen-year restriction 
period" with the exception of documents relating to "state's secrets... and inter-agency or 
intra-agency memoranda... plus claims of executive privilege."
82
 This meant the 
Commission fully endorsed the practice of providing the executive with the unilateral 
authority to conceal matters of "national security" from the public despite the lessons 
learned from Watergate. 
 The minority report produced by Brownell's legal staff made a similar argument 
for access to presidential records. Except the minority report suggested that both the 
kinds materials categorized under federal records and presidential public papers in the 
majority report should be subject to Freedom of Information Act regulations.
83
 The report 
also recommended that there should not be a full-disclosure period such as the 15 years 
recommended as mentioned in the majority report. Instead, researchers would have to 
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individually request access to the specific materials of former presidents on their own 
accord. Needless to say, these reports ensured a presidential records bill that would 
ultimately fail to meet public expectations. Though scholars did not realize this until over 
twenty years later. 
 Drawing on the recommendations made by the two Commission reports, 
Congress started drafting presidential records legislation in the fall of 1977. "[O]n 
September, 17, 1977 Congressman Richardson Preyer (Dem-NC) introduced a bill to 
amend the Freedom of Information Act to insure public access to the official papers of 
the President."
84
 This bill embodied the suggestions made in the minority report produced 
by Chairman Brownell's legal staff. The Preyer bill raised public suspicion of its 
intentions and drew fierce criticism from historians and archivists. As a result, "Rep. 
Brademus (D-Ind.) and Rep. Alan Ertel (D-Penn.) introduced a separate bill on 
presidential records on February 20, 1978."
85
 Soon "[a] companion to this bill was 
introduced in the Senate by Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-Wisc.) on February 27."
86
 Both 
the Brademus-Ertel bill and Nelson bill "gave to the President complete control over his 
records for fifteen years, as recommended by the majority report."
87
 
 On February 23, 1977 the House of Representatives started hearings to mull over 
the two proposals. The "[f]our days of hearings reflected little support for [the] 
immediate access [as contained in the Preyer bill], but [raised] considerable concern over 
the unnecessary lengthy fifteen year moratorium" as suggested by the Brademus-Ertel 
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 Consequently, negotiations after the hearings produced a compromise 
bill whereby "the President had limited control of his papers for ten years. The 
restrictions which could be imposed were similar to the FOI Act restrictions contained in 
the Preyer bill."
89
 Thus, Congress codified the government secrecy initiatives as 
discussed on the January 14, 1977 panel in their legislation. 
 Despite the compromise between Preyer, Brademus, and Ertel the measures in the 
bill were not strong enough for the executive branch to accept. In the spring of 1978, the 
Carter "[a]dministration... [started] resisting, not promoting, public access to 
documents."
90
 Carter had two primary reservations regarding the presidential records 
legislation. First, he expressed grave concern over the so-called "chilling effect" even 
though the proposed legislation offered ample time for the presidential public papers to 
chill before public release. Second, Carter did not want his presidential records to be 
subject to the new legislation. This harkened back to the point made by William J. 
Hopkins that outgoing administrations enjoyed the traditional way of handling the 
materials of former presidents.  
 Carter stood firm during the negotiations between Congress and the White House. 
This served to water the already weak legislation down even more. Congress and the 
Carter administration finally agreed upon a solution that "allows the President to restrict 
access to six categories of information for twelve years. The six categories include 
classified records, material exempted by statute or relating to Federal appointments, trade 
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secrets, personnel, investigations, etc."
91
 However, this did not apply to federal records. 
This measure applied to presidential public papers. Moreover, the final version of the bill 
that Carter signed into law included a provision that allows the incumbent president to 
unilaterally determine the extent of public access to both federal records and presidential 
public papers through the use of executive orders.
92
  
 This narrative demonstrates that after four years of exhaustive deliberation since 
the release of the smoking gun tape, the policy makers of the United States arrived back 
at the pre-Watergate conclusion that the president knows best. The provisions in the 
presidential records bill allowed the executive branch to keep its communications from 
the public for up to 12 years and, if need be, extend the restrictions even longer through 
the signing of executive orders in spite of the fact that unfettered access to confidential 
communications allowed the public to reign in Nixon for his involvement in Watergate.
93
 
The bill also granted sweeping authority to the president to classify and conceal 
controversial issues under the premise of national security through executive orders.
94
 In 
doing so, the law whitewashed the history of Watergate due to the fact that Nixon 
attempted to use national security as a vehicle to hide his involvement in Watergate from 
the public.  
 President Carter signed the Presidential Records Act into law on November 6, 
1978 and, as a result, codified the very practices that enabled Watergate to take place into 
American law. Which begs the question: why did the Presidential Records Act come into 
being? The Commission panel discussion on January 14, 1977 suggests that the law was 
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not meant to ensure general public access to presidential records and transparency in 
government. Rather, the law was created to abolish the presidential library system and in 
its place establish a centralized location at the National Archives for the housing of 
duplicate copies of federal records from former administrations. This arrangement 
guaranteed that incumbent presidents and their staff would have ready access to the 
information generated by former administrations and, subsequently, bridge the continuity 
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III. Specters of Watergate: In the Executive We Trust 
 
  "It has become clear to Congress that the PRA is not sufficiently clear with 
 respect to its disclosure mandates. Without further Congressional action each 
 successive President likely will issue his own executive order interpreting the 
 original PRA, thus making the public's access to Presidential records contingent 
 upon the will of the executive..."—Report of the Committee on Homeland 
 Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, May 19, 2009 
 
 President Ronald Reagan signed the first executive order affecting the Presidential 
Records Act on January 16, 1989. In Executive Order 12667, President Reagan 
unilaterally established procedures for the implementation of the Presidential Records 
Act. As mentioned in the proceeding chapter, the Presidential Records Act allowed this 
practice. The directives in the Reagan order covered three distinct areas: processes for 
notifying officials of the National Archives and Records Administration's intent on 
disclosing presidential records, policies regarding the handling of executive privilege 
claims from former and incumbent presidents, and guidelines for judicial review.
95
  
 The order altered the Presidential Records Act in many ways. Executive Order 
12267 reduced the number of categories for claims of executive privilege from six to 
three but, in doing so, expanded the scope of executive privilege.
96
 These new ambiguous 
categories established by the executive order were "national security (including the 
conduct of foreign relations), law enforcement, or the deliberative processes of the 
Executive branch."
97
 The undefined terminology used to establish these new categories 
allowed the president to claim privilege over virtually any material at their own 
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discretion. In addition to expanding the definition of executive privilege from the original 
language of the Presidential Records Act, Executive Order 12667 also expanded the 
notification procedures by including incumbent presidents and their legal staff in the 
review process.  
 The language in the Presidential Records Act, mandated that the Archivist had to 
notify former presidents or their designated representatives of the release of their 
presidential materials. However, the Archivist was only required to alert former 
presidents of materials that explicitly raised concerns relevant to executive privilege.
98
 
Moreover, the Presidential Records Act required former presidents to establish the 
perimeters for their own individual privilege claims prior to leaving office. In other 
words, the Presidential Records Act ordered presidents to personally identify and flag 
specific materials that they wished to assert claims of executive privilege over before 
their presidential term ended. This served as the basis for determining the validity of 
executive privilege claims and guided the Archivist in his or her role of chief arbiter over 
presidential records. 
 The Reagan order changed this dynamic in a few ways. First, it allowed former 
presidents to assert claims of privilege even after leaving office. Second, the order 
mandated that the Archivist also inform the incumbent president, as well as many other 
government entities including the Attorney General and the White House Counsel, of the 
release of records of former presidents. In doing so Executive Order 12667 created an 
extensive network of executive oversight by mandating a full, secondary review of all 
presidential materials before their release. Lastly, the executive order removed the 
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Archivist as custodian of presidential records and chief arbiter of executive privilege 
claims by providing the incumbent president, absent a court order, with the final say over 
disclosing materials from past presidencies. 
 Despite these sweeping unilateral reforms to the Presidential Records Act, 
"[Executive Order] 12667 received little critical examination until" over a decade later 
when the first presidential records came up for public release.
99
 The presidential records 
of Ronald Reagan were supposed to be released in January of 2001. However, President 
George W. Bush postponed the release of these records on three separate occasions.
100
 
Then on November 1, 2001 President Bush issued Executive Order 13233. This was the 
second executive order to affect the implementation of the Presidential Records Act but, 
unlike the Reagan executive order, this one ignited a heated debate over the role of the 
executive branch in enforcing the Presidential Records Act.  
 The outrage stemmed from the numerous changes to the implementation of the 
PRA that President Bush made in the executive order. The ten-section order made three 
new and bold proclamations just in the second section. First, Executive Order 13233 
rescinded the three categories of executive privilege as annotated in the Reagan order. In 
their place, the Bush order established four new categories. These categories were "the 
states secrets privilege... the presidential communications privilege... the attorney-client 
                                                          
99
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or attorney work product privileges... and... the deliberative processes privilege."
101
 This 
language enabled the president to keep the public in the dark on a number of issues from 
"military, diplomatic, and national security secrets" to "communications of the President 
or his advisors" to "legal advice or legal work" and even to "the deliberative processes of 
the President or his advisors" past the twelve-year restriction period established by the 
PRA.
102
 Moreover, the executive order took its definition of executive privilege further 
by relying on two Supreme Court cases to frame the issue. 
 Executive Order 13233 stated that, according to the ruling in Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services, "constitutionally based privileges available to a 
President 'survive... the individual President's tenure" and that: 
 a former President, although no longer a Government official, may assert 
 constitutionally based privileges with respect to his Administration's Presidential 
 records, and expressly rejected the argument that 'only an incumbent President 
 can assert the privilege of the Presidency.'
103
 
   
This provision served as the basis for the new measures that empowered former 
presidents to evoke claims of privilege even after leaving office. In addition to this, the 
executive order cited the Supreme Court ruling on United States v. Nixon in its 
interpretation of executive privilege. Executive Order 13233 decreed that "a party 
seeking to overcome the constitutionally based privileges that apply to Presidential  
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records must establish at least a 'demonstrated, specific need' for particular records."
104
 
The language in this provision mandated that individuals or institutions seeking access to 
records sealed under executive privilege must first establish a credible reason for 
requesting the records. This ambiguous phrase provided a veto to the incumbent and 
former presidents to deny access to any Freedom of Information request for records that 
they did not wish to release. However, these were not the only changes to the PRA. 
 Executive Order 13233 also established a 90 day review period for former 
presidents to assess their materials prior to their public release.
105
 The intent behind this 
provision was to codify the language in the Nixon v. Administrator of General Services 
ruling to extend executive privilege past the end of the former president's term. In other 
words, it amended the PRA from mandating presidents to identify and exert privilege 
over materials prior to leaving office to allowing former presidents to continuously 
evaluate their materials prior to their release.
106
 In the same section, this provision was 
accompanied by a tedious review process whereby both incumbent and former presidents 
had to agree not to evoke executive privilege over materials designated for release before 
the Archivist could release the materials to the public.
107
 This consensus measure ensured 
that the most controversial and sensitive records of former administrations faced a 
rigorous review process prior to their authorized release by the incumbent president. The 
arrangement ensured that virtually no contentious presidential records would ever hit the 
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public domain. Yet the extended executive privilege in two other ways. 
 First, the Bush order authorized former presidents to identify a representative to 
serve in their place if the former president was unable to execute his or her duties of 
reviewing the materials that the National Archives intended to release.  The order boldly 
stated that "[u]pon the death or disability of a former President, the former President's 
designated representative shall act on his behalf for purposes of this Act and this order, 
including with respect to the assertion of constitutionally based privileges."
108
 In doing so 
the Bush administration asserted that, in pursuant to the United States v. Nixon ruling, 
executive privilege claims for former presidents could be evoked from beyond the grave 
through an intermediary. In addition to this provision, Executive Order 13233 also 
declared that: 
 this order shall also apply with respect to any such records that are subject to any 
 constitutionally based privilege that the former Vice President may be entitled to 
 invoke, but in the administration of this order with respect to such records, 
 references in this order to a former President shall be deemed also to be references 




In other words, the Bush order also extended the right of evoking executive privilege to 
former vice presidents and the review process for these records, prior to their release by 
the Archivist, was the same review process for the records of former presidents. Despite 
the peculiarity of some of these provisions, the Bush administration insisted that they 
were vital to thoroughly implement the PRA.
110
 
 Needless to say, these new interpretations of executive privilege and the PRA 
drew immediate and fierce criticism from lawmakers and scholars. On November 7, 2001 
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the Minority Staff for the Committee on Government Reform in the House of 
Representatives issued a summary of the Bush executive order. This report questioned 
the scope of executive privilege established by the executive order and viewed it as "in 
direct conflict with the Presidential Records Act.
111
 The New York Times proclaimed that 
"Executive Order 13233 ended more than 30 years of increasing openness in 
government."
112
 A few days later, the American Historical Association offered its critique 
of the Bush order. In an open letter to Chairman of the Committee on Government 
Reform, Stephen Horn, AHA Executive Director Arnita A. Jones declared that: 
 Executive Order 13233... makes a mockery of the... [PRA] and the intent of the 
 Congress in enacting it. Far from establishing orderly procedures for the release 
 of presidential records as the Bush administration claims, the order devises a 
 series of nearly impenetrable barricades to information about presidential 




Journalist Eric Alterman expressed similar concerns. In a December, 2001 piece for The 
Nation Alterman argued that "Executive Order 13233... eviscerates the nation's access to 
its own history, effectively overturning the Presidential Records Act (PRA) of 1978 by 
fiat."
114
 Similarly, the following year, the American Political Science Association 
provided its own response to the Bush order in the form of open letter to Chairman Horn. 
In it, Robert D. Putnam and Robert J. Spitzer assert that "Executive Order 13233 conflicts 
with the premise of the Presidential Records Act of 1978, which calls for presidential 
records to become public and places the burden on the government to insure such records  
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are opened for review and done so on a timely basis."
115
 However, as noted in the 
previous chapter, the Presidential Records Act assured nothing of the sort. 
 Nevertheless, while these individuals aired their grievances, a complaint was filed 
with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of the 
American Historical Association, Hugh Davis Graham, Stanley I. Kutler, the National 
Security Archive, the Organization of American Historians, Public Citizen, and the 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press on November 28, 2001 by the Public 
Citizen Litigation Group.
116
 In their complaint, the group declared seven ways in which 
Executive Order 13233 "violates the PRA."
117
  
 First, the plaintiffs claimed "that the Bush Order... [made] it possible for materials 
to be withheld for an unlimited time because it... [let] incumbent and former presidents to 
review the materials before their release."
118
 Second, they argued "that the Bush Order 
violate[d] the PRA by requiring the incumbent president to concur with a former 
president's assertion of privilege, absent compelling circumstances, even if there is no 
legal basis for the exercise of privilege."
119
 Third, the group asserted "that the Bush Order 
impermissibly requires the Archivist to wait until the former president permits the release 
of records, even if the incumbent president authorized their release."
120
 Fourth, the 
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plaintiffs claimed "that the Bush Order violates the PRA by allowing a former president 
who is deceased or disabled to designate a representative to make determinations about 
whether to assert executive privilege over records or to allow public access to them."
121
 
Fifth, they questioned whether "a former president is entitled to assert a claim of 
executive privilege independent from a former or incumbent president, or that such a 
claim by a former vice president is entitled to the same treatment as a privilege claim by a 
president."
122
 Sixth, the group claimed "that the Bush Border is contrary to NARA's 
regulations, which allow the Archivist to open records even when a former president has 
asserted privilege, if he determines that such privilege claim is improper."
123
 Lastly, they 
argued "that the Bush Order impermissibly expands the constitutional scope of executive 
privilege... and that the Archivist's implementation of the Bush Order constitutes arbitrary 
and capricious agency action."
124
 
 On almost all grounds, the District Court ruled that "the suit [was] nonjusticiable, 
and consequently the Court... [had] no jurisdiction over the case."
125
 Though the District 
Court did acknowledge the legitimacy of the plaintiffs' first grievance. However, the 
Court stated that "[p]laintiffs' past injury [inflicted by section 3(b) of Executive Order 
13233 was] simply not redressable by the relief they seek, and their only possible 
redressable injury... [was] hypothetical."
126
 The group walked away from the dispute 
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empty handed but, while they waged this 4 year court battle, Congress started their own 
efforts to strike down Executive Order 13233 through legislation.  
 In 2002 a bipartisan coalition led by, Representative Stephen Horn, drafted and 
submitted a bill that aimed to rescind the controversial Bush order.
127
 However, this bill 
never made it to the floor for a vote. Later, in 2007 Congress attempted to pass similar 
legislation again.
128
 This bill overwhelmingly passed in the House of Representatives, but 
died in committee at the hands of Senator Jim Bunning in the Senate.
129
 Congress 
attempted to pass the legislation once again in 2009.
130
 Though this bill did not make it to 
the floor of the Senate either.  
 Ironically, none of these bills addressed the primary concerns that were raised by 
the plaintiffs in the American Historical Association v. National Archives and Records 
Administration case. Sure the bills moved to rescind Executive Order 13233 but, on the 
other hand, all three codified the extended review period for former presidents that was 
instituted by the Bush Order.
131
 Although, the review period was reduced from 90 days, 
with the capability of indefinite extensions, in the Bush Order to 20 days with only the 
opportunity for another 20 days extension in the amendment bills. Regardless of this 
slight alternation, this demonstrated that Congress sympathized with the Bush 
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administration on its demonstrated need for an extended review period. Thus the PRA 
amendment bills were not offered in order to ensure inevitable public access to the 
materials of former presidents. Rather, these bills were presented in order to provide the 
executive branch with more flexibility in its time constraints on executive privilege.
132
 
Nevertheless, Executive Order 13233 was eventually repealed and this provision 
disappeared along with it.  
 On January 21, 2009 President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13489 that 
rescinded the Bush order.
133
 This executive order reestablished the PRA implementation 
guidelines constructed by the Reagan order. It even contained the same interpretation of 
categories concerning executive privilege.
134
 In addition, the Obama order reinstituted the 
incumbent president as the chief arbiter on the disclosure of the materials of former 
presidents.
135
 Despite this disturbing development, advocates  for government 
transparency hailed Executive Order 13489 as a victory for open government.
136
 This 
trend, from the Reagan presidency to the Obama presidency, suggests that the public does 
not understand the intent behind the PRA. If they did then they would have not been 
outraged by Executive Order 13233. However, this trend also suggest that the public is 
naively content with allowing one person to determine how much we know about the 
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 In closing, this thesis demonstrated that our understanding of Watergate and the 
Presidential Records Act is misguided. Contrary to popular belief, Watergate did not 
usher in a new era of transparency and accountability in the executive branch. This was 
exhibited by the pardoning of Nixon by President Ford and the commuting of G. Gordon 
Liddy's sentence by President Carter. The only accountability and transparency 
immediately produced during Watergate was the sequestering of Nixon's materials. 
However, the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974 permitted 
the  Archivist to release only the materials relevant to Watergate. Did this provision of 
the PRMPA conceal other misdeeds of the Nixon administration from the public? 
Possibly. 
 The PRMPA worked in another way to undermine open government advocacy. 
The mandate for President Ford to process Nixon's presidential records for release to the 
Archivist delayed Ford's appointments to the National Study Commission on Records and 
Documents of Federal Officials. Moreover, the fervor over the release of the Watergate 
materials redirected public interest and eclipsed the activities of the Commission once 
they conducted their investigations. This disinterest allowed the Commission to make 
bold recommendations for the presidential records legislation without the hassle of public 
criticism. These measures included the need to protect confidential communications 
within the executive branch as well as prevent the hasty public release of sensitive 
materials relating to national security. In doing so, the Commission affirmed that the 
United States did not learn anything from Watergate for the reason that Nixon attempted 
to use national security as a means to shield confidential communications that implicated 
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him and his advisors in obstruction of justice. The majority of recommendations offered 
by the Commission ended up in the Presidential Records Act of 1978.  
 However, the PRA did not ensure public ownership and access to the records of 
presidential records as some suggest. The true intent behind the PRA can be traced back 
to the January 14, 1977 Commission panel discussion. During the discussion, several 
participants expressed a need for a centralized location for the duplicate copies of the 
federal records from former presidential administrations so that the incumbent president 
and his or her staff could have ready access to these materials for continuity and practical 
use. Thus the purpose of the PRA was to abolish the presidential libraries system, which 
scattered the duplicate copies of federal records from former administrations around the 
country, and consolidate them under the control of the Archivist at the National Archives. 
Public access to the presidential public papers of former presidents was just a perk to this 
arrangement. Although, the PRA allowed the president to further restrict access to these 
materials through the use of executive orders and claims of executive privilege.  
 In spite of the subtle intent of the PRA, lawmakers and scholars still argue that the 
law was meant to provide public ownership and access to the materials of former 
presidents. Even though the Reagan and Obama executive orders that these individuals 
support prove otherwise. Nevertheless, this naïveté and stubbornness empowers Congress 
and the executive branch to continue to distort the history of Watergate and mislead the 
public as to the intent of the Presidential Records Act. Suffice it to say, the accountability 
and transparency measures that the public wants will not come without a comprehensive 
PRA amendment that reforms the use of executive order and claims of executive 
privilege that safeguards confidential communications and issues of "national security." 
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